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Hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited for functioning as an 
institutional bypass around the bureaucratic procedures and 
providing expedient responses to the changing needs of 
administrative governance.  As hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized 
in transnational regulation, however, concerns have arisen over the 
lack of transparency and the evasion of accountability in the face of 
their informality and flexibility.  This article aims to explore the 
issues surrounding the democratic legitimacy of transnational 
hybrid administration through a case study of the Cross-Straits 
Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) provided in the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between the Straits 
Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits, two private legal bodies on behalf of Taiwan and 
China, respectively.  I argue that the CSECC is deliberately 
designed to avoid the institutional features associated with the idea 
of publicness.  Both traditional constitutional design and global 
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administrative law fall short of restoring the idea of publicness to 
transnational hybrid administration in the hybrid cross-strait 
economic regulation.  As a result, the idea of publicness is 
withering away in the cross-strait economic regulation, laying siege 
to the democratic legitimacy of the extraconstitutional hybrid 
administration across the Taiwan Strait. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“New governance” strategies have been adopted to address 
multifarious governance needs and challenges facing traditional 
administrative authorities.1  Among them, privatization, contracting-out 
(or outsourcing), and “hybridity” are regarded as pivotal to the 
organizational innovation of administration and regulation.2  Functions 
                                                 
1  See generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (addressing complex social problems and the challenges they 
raise for understanding law and constitutionalism, as well as legal and constitutional 
values). 
2 While privatization means “the asset sale of state-owned industries,” contracting-out (or 
outsourcing) refers to “entrust[ing] a private entity with a task that remains under public 
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and powers that have traditionally rested with public agencies are 
contracted out to institutions that are organized differently and function 
independently from traditional public agencies, from which emerge new 
regulatory bodies that transcend the distinction between the public agency 
and the private corporation and lead to hybrid regulation and 
administration.3  These new hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited 
in functional terms and function as an institutional bypass around 
bureaucratic procedures, providing expedient responses to the changing 
needs of administrative governance at a lower price.4  Hybrid regulation 
does not only gain currency in the traditional domestic regulatory 
context,5 but it is also deployed beyond national borders to address the 
growing needs of transnational regulation.6 
However, concerns have arisen over the lack of transparency and 
evasion of accountability in the face of the informality and flexibility that 
is characteristic of hybrid regulatory bodies.7  These concerns are not only 
that the idea of publicness, which underlies public authorities in 
constitutional democracy, has been at risk with the privatization of 
regulation.8  Also, as hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized in transnational 
                                                                                                               
supervision and is not purely left to the market.”  Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and 
‘Public Values’: A Theoretical and Comparative Approach, in COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 511, 511 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010); 
see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2003) (discussing how privatization and contracting-out can be 
understood as different forms of privatization in a broad sense).  When the organization 
that takes over the devolved governmental function is hard to characterize as public or 
private, it becomes institutionally hybrid.  Daphne Barak-Erez, Three Questions of 
Privatization, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra, at 493–97; see also Gráinne 
de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 1, at 1, 6–9 (giving a 
measure-oriented conception of hybridity). 
3  See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 8–12 (2003) (discussing 
different types of hybrid and private regulatory bodies); William J. Novak, Public-Private 
Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23, 27–28 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) 
(showing how hybrid/private bodies can be traced to the blurring of conceptions of private 
and public in the Middle Ages). 
4 KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
5 See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003) (casting historical light on the adoption of 
public-private partnerships in the U.S. context). 
6 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 518 (2009). 
7 Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 1, 4–5. 
8 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 168–93 (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; Andrew Arato, Procedural Law and Civil 
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regulation, they threaten to further upend the constitutional structure of 
checks and balances with respect to foreign affairs and pose fundamental 
challenges to the core of democratic legitimacy.9 
In response, there has been new interest in the idea of 
publicness. 10   The values of publicness have been identified in the 
functioning of administrative law beyond the realm of constitutional law.  
The idea of publicness is seen as embedded in the requirements of reason-
giving and due process, including the rights to timely notice, meaningful 
hearing, and effective judicial review. 11   For this reason, global 
administrative law is praised as the antidote to secrecy and the 
accountability avoidance caused by deployment of hybrid administration 
in transnational regulation. 12   The problem of democratic legitimacy 
                                                                                                               
Society: Interpreting the Radical Democratic Paradigm, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 26 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998) 
(“Without proper reflection . . . private and public autonomy are understood . . . as a zero 
sum game, while democracy and constitutional rights are generally viewed in terms of 
potential conflict and antagonism[.]”); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS 
SOCIETY 1–26 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) [hereinafter HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE] (giving a historical account of the idea of 
publicness). 
9 See Christoph Engel, Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge 
to Constitutional Law, in SPONTANEOUS ORDER, ORGANIZATION AND THE LAW: ROADS TO A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY 141, 145 (Liber Amicorum et al. eds., 2003) (critically analyzing 
the challenges from transnational hybrid regulatory bodies to national constitutuional 
orders); Paul Craig, Shared Administration and Networks: Global and EU Perspectives, in 
VALUES IN GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81, 107–08, 113–15 (Gordon Anthony et al. eds., 
2011) (examining the literature on policy networks). 
10 John Morison & Gordon Anthony, The Place of Public Interest, in VALUES IN GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 9, at 215.  See generally JANET NEWMAN & JOHN 
CLARKE, PUBLICS, POLITICS AND POWER: REMAKING THE PUBLIC IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
(2009); Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in MORAL 
UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 
2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Inter-Public Law]; Armin von Bogdandy, General 
Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, 9 GERMAN L.J. 
1909, 1918–21 (2008); Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 
GERMAN L.J. 1375 (2008); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Changing Roles of 
International Organizations: Global Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies, 
6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 655 (2009); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global 
Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Concept of 
‘Law’]; Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of 
International Organizations Law, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 319, 353–54 (2009); Ming-Sung 
Kuo, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law: A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury, 
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 997, 999–1001 (2009). 
11 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 41–50. 
12 Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 31–42 (2005). 
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concerning transnational hybrid administration seems to find its resolution 
in publicness-centered global administrative law.13 
Yet, what if public authorities deliberately design a regulatory 
body to stay away from the idea of publicness?  What if public authorities 
create a private regulatory body as a veneer to address regulatory issues, 
and transnational ones at that?  Under such circumstances, is global 
administrative law underpinned by the idea of publicness an effective tool 
to address the issues of transparency and accountability arising from what 
I call an “ultra hybrid” regulatory body?14  In other words, if the deviation 
from the idea of publicness is the inbuilt value, instead of merely function 
run amok, does this pose a challenge to global administrative law?  Does it 
expose the functional limits of global administrative law in addressing the 
challenges of transnational hybrid administration? 
To address these issues, I present a case study in this article of the 
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee (hereinafter CSECC), 
provided in the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (hereinafter ECFA) recently signed between the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (hereinafter SEF) and the Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits (hereinafter ARATS), two private legal bodies 
on behalf of Taiwan and China, respectively.15  The purpose of this case 
study is to examine, from the perspective of Taiwan, how the idea of 
publicness at the core of public authorities in constitutional democracy is 
doubly strained in the face of hybrid administration in transnational 
regulation.16  I argue that the CSECC is deliberately designed to avoid the 
institutional features associated with the idea of publicness.  It not only 
bypasses the constitutional structure of checks and balances by escaping 
parliamentary oversight, but this hybrid administration’s organizational 
and procedural features expose the functional limits of global 
administrative law.  As the idea of publicness, institutionalized in the 
constitutional system of checks and balances and embedded in the 
functioning of global administrative law, fails to rein in the CSECC, 
transnational hybrid administration raises the question of its own 
democratic legitimacy. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:  in Part II, I 
first analyze the legal strategy underpinning the political rapprochement 
                                                 
13 Id. at 50.  See also Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 763 (2004) (arguing that global administration raises new accountability 
problems, and that addressing the problems has important implications for democratic 
practice and theory). 
14 For a discussion of an “ultra hybrid regulatory body," see infra III.B. 
15 STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, CROSS-STRAITS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT (2010) [hereinafter ECFA]. 
16 Since the focus of this article is on the impact of transnational hybrid administration on 
the issues surrounding democratic legitimacy in constitutional democracy, I tackle these 
issues from the perspective of Taiwan, which has a democratically elected government. 
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between Taiwan and China.  In Part III, I proceed to discuss how 
democratic legitimacy is threatened by the use of hybrid administration in 
economic regulation across the Taiwan Strait.  I first establish that the 
underlying idea of publicness of public authorities is institutionalized in 
the constitutional system of checks and balances and in the functioning of 
administrative law.  Yet, this state-oriented understanding of publicness is 
tenuously strained in the face of the globalizing regulatory environment.  
On the one hand, transnational hybrid administration displaces the idea of 
publicness embodied in the constitution as globalization has weakened 
legislative oversight over transnational administrative acts.  Thus, global 
administrative law reflects the trend of searching for the idea of publicness 
beyond the state.  On the other hand, the function of global administrative 
law is to keep private/hybrid administration from running amok at the cost 
of public interest.   However, the effect of turning to global administrative 
law is constrained when facing an ultra hybrid regulatory body.  I then 
take a closer look at the legal framework in Taiwan that governs relations 
between Taiwan and China.  I argue that it not only eludes the legal 
control over the executive power in a constitutional state, but also shows 
that global administrative law reaches its limit in reining in hybrid/private 
administration when non-publicness becomes an end in itself.  Part IV 
provides a summary of the argument and concludes that the idea of 
publicness is withering away in the hybrid regulation across the Taiwan 
Strait, and is laying siege to the democratic legitimacy of the cross-strait 
hybrid administration. 
II. INSTITUTIONALIZING HYBRIDITY:  THE STRATEGY TO CROSS 
THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
This part aims to tell the story of the underlying legal strategy of 
the political rapprochement between Taiwan and China.  Like other cases 
of conciliation between political rivals, the legal framework underpinning 
the cross-strait relations was not the product of automatic legal 
functioning, but has instead resulted from political decisions.17  To reveal 
the relationship between law and politics in the rapprochement between 
Taiwan and China, I first introduce the political background from which 
the legal framework of the cross-strait relations has emerged.  Law has 
been creatively constructed and interpreted to provide a framework within 
which cross-strait regulatory issues following the political rapprochement 
can be addressed.  Then I show how the legal framework has moved from 
                                                 
17 See Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Reconciliation as a Political Concept: Some Observations and 
Remarks, in MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH: A 
VIEW FROM EUROPE 197 (Francisco Ferrándiz & Antonius C.G.M. Robben eds., 2007) 
(discussing observations of and reflections on reconciliation in connection with peace 
processes and peace-building initiatives). 
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ad hoc management to the signing of ECFA, formally institutionalizing 
the idea of hybridity in the cross-strait economic regulation. 
A. From Politics to Law: The Political Background and the 
Legal Framework of the Cross-Strait Relations 
The complicated relationship between Taiwan and China dates 
back to the Chinese Civil War of 1945–49.  When the Allies, including 
China, defeated Japan to end World War II (WWII) in 1945, Taiwan was 
part of Japan’s territory as a result of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki 
between Japan and the (Chinese) Qing Empire.18  As part of the Allies’ 
post-WWII transitional arrangement, the Allied Powers militarily 
occupied Taiwan after Japan’s unconditional capitulation to the Allies.19  
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers and the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces in 
the Far East, entrusted the occupation of Taiwan and Northern Vietnam to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and his representatives. 20   Yet, 
Generalissimo Chiang acted beyond his mandate, governing Taiwan as a 
province of China before Taiwan’s legal status was settled.21  Following 
the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1945, China declared a state of 
emergency in 1948, but did not impose martial law rule on Taiwan until 
May 1949.22  Generalissimo Chiang’s Nationalist (or KMT) government 
lost ground to the Communists in China both militarily and politically.23  
                                                 
18 Lung-Chu Chen & W.M. Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 
81 YALE L.J. 599, 610–11 (1972). 
19 Id., at 611–12, n.43. 
20 Id. at n.43 (“The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary 
forces within China excluding Manchuria, and Formosa and French Indo-China north of 
sixteen degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai[-]Shek[.]”). 
21  For example, Generalissimo Chiang violated his mandate by imposing Chinese 
nationality on Taiwanese inhabitants, who were still subjects of the Japanese Empire in 
1945.  Id., at 652 n.200.  This unilateral act has been retrospectively recognized in the 
Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (Taipei Treaty), a peace treaty 
between Chiang’s regime in Taipei and Japan in 1952.  Treaty of Peace between the 
Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, art. X, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3.  Since 
the treaty does not include China, it is not clear whether it ended the state of war between 
China and Japan under international law. 
22 The state of emergency, i.e. the “state of mobilization,” was not declared according to 
the constitutional provisions regarding the declaration of a state of emergency.  Rather, the 
Constitution was suspended to create unchecked emergency powers that were entrusted to 
the president.  To enlarge the presidential powers by shifting the executive power from the 
prime minister to the president and bypassing the Constitution’s limited state of emergency, 
Temporary Articles were enacted in accordance with the constitutional provisions 
regarding constitutional revision on December 10, 1948, although they were separate from 
the Constitution of 1946.  Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th 
Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y. J. 531, 541 
(2002). 
23 KMT stands for “Kuomintang,” also known as the Nationalist Party. 
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However, Chiang ordered his loyalist troops and civilian followers to 
regroup in Taiwan, despite his own ambiguous domestic and international 
legal status.24 
Before Generalissimo Chiang and his loyalists fled to Taiwan, 
Chinese Communists had formed a new national government in Beijing 
and proclaimed the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 
October 1, 1949.25  Even so, Generalissimo Chiang’s troops continued to 
fight their Communist rivals in China as the newly established PRC 
struggled to gain international recognition amid the global fear of the 
expansion of communism.26  In the meantime, he moved the defeated 
Nationalist government to Taiwan in December 1949, but continued using 
the name the Republic of China (ROC). 27   Despite an unresolved 
international law status, Taiwan has remained governed by the terms of 
the 1946 ROC Constitution.28  Moreover, the ROC regime in Taiwan did 
not forfeit its claim as the legitimate government of China and conducted 
several failed commando raids along China’s southeast coast in the 
1950s.29  In sum, as a consequence of the Civil War, Chinese warring 
forces claimed that Taiwan was a part of China even though the rivaling 
                                                 
24 In terms of international law, Taiwan remained part of Japan but was under the 
occupation of the Allied Powers.  See Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 20–22 (2004) (“In May 1951 . . . General MacArthur said, 
‘Formosa is still a part of Japan[.]’”); see also Chen & Reisman, supra note 18, at 639–41 
(“Chiang . . . acted as the trustee of the Allied Forces[.]”); cf. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE 
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2d ed. 2006) (“With the consent of the 
Allied Powers, administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the 
Republic of China[.]”).  But see Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and 
International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
765, 769 (2007) (“After the Second World War, the Japanese retreated from Taiwan under 
the terms of the Cairo Declaration, issued in 1943, which mandated that Taiwan ‘be 
returned to the Republic of China.’”).  In regard to the Republic of China’s (ROC) 
domestic law, Chiang Kai-Shek announced his “retirement” and the “disclaimer” of 
presidential powers to Vice President Li Tsung-Jen on January 21, 1949, while Li formally 
succeeded to presidency on the same day.  Thus, legally speaking, Generalissimo Chiang 
and his loyal troops’ retreat to Taiwan without President Li’s authorization was effectively 
a coup d’état.  Moreover, President Li fled to the U.S. in 1949 in his capacity as Acting 
President; the 1946 ROC regime collapsed in December 1949.  Notably, several members 
of the three houses of Parliament convened a “rump Parliament” in Taiwan, which laid the 
ostensible legal ground for the post-1949 ROC regime.  Robert E. Bedeski, Li Tsung-Jen 
and the Demise of China’s “Third Force”, 5 ASIAN SURV. 616, 622–24 (1965). 
25 MICHAEL BRECHER & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS 382 (1997). 
26 R. Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China, 26 
HIST. J. 139, 153 (2009). 
27 Chiang, supra note 24, at 21. 
28 The ROC Constitution was passed by the Constituent National Assembly in 1946 but did 
not come into effect until December 25, 1947.  Wen-Chen Chang, East Asian Foundations 
for Constitutionalism: Three Models Reconstructed, 3 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 111, 123 
(2008). 
29 NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER, STRAIT TALK: UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS AND THE 
CRISIS WITH CHINA 15 (2009). 
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governing authorities in Taiwan and China regarded each other as rebels 
to be forcefully suppressed. 
In the 1980s, the international political standing of both the PRC 
and the ROC changed.30  However, Taiwan and China’s perspectives on 
their political rivalry did not change until Taiwan underwent 
democratization in the 1980s.  Dr. Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese, 
succeeded to the presidency in 1988 after the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo, 
Generalissimo Chiang’s elder son and anointed successor.31  During this 
time, Taiwan was already under a gradual process of political reform, 
which ultimately brought about fundamental changes to cross-strait 
relations. 32   Acknowledging the end of Chiangs’ policy to reclaim 
Nationalist rule in China through military means, President Lee declared 
an end to the state of emergency in 1991.33  In addition, the bans on post, 
communications, and travel across the Taiwan Strait were lifted as part of 
Taiwan’s new conciliatory policy toward China.34  Correspondingly, the 
ROC Constitution of 1946 was amended to reflect the new political reality.  
Using the model of the pre-unification Basic Treaty of West Germany, the 
jurisdiction of the ROC Constitution was confined to Taiwan and the 
                                                 
30 Generalissimo Chiang’s representative controlled China’s seat in the United Nations 
until 1971 when the United States, Taiwan’s only major ally, failed to garner enough votes 
in the General Assembly to support its stance under which the resolution of China’s 
legitimate representation would require a two-thirds majority.  Following the defeat in the 
vote over the procedural question, Taiwan’s representative announced Taiwan’s 
withdrawal from the U.N. before the General Assembly resolved to “expel forthwith the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the 
United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”  G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), U.N. 
GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/630, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1971).  After Chiang’s government lost 
its seat in the U.N., it faced a series of diplomatic defeats as well; now, only twenty-three 
countries recognize the ROC regime as the legitimate representative of China and have 
diplomatic relations.  See Chiang, supra note 24, at 67–71 (“[T]he question of China's 
representation in the General Assembly agenda was made each year from 1953 through 
1960 by a member of the Soviet bloc.  Each time the proposal was rejected.”). 
31 Here, “Native Taiwanese” refers to persons whose forebears immigrated to Taiwan 
before 1945, even though most, like immigrants who moved after 1945, were ethnically 
Han Chinese.  See Chen & Reisman, supra note 18, at 625–26 (“From the sixteenth 
century onward, the Chinese population . . . created a new Taiwanese ethnic identity[.]”).  
Generalissimo Chiang died in 1975, and the presidency passed to Vice President Yen 
Chia-Kan, who was considered a caretaker president until Chiang Ching-Kuo was elected 
in 1978.  John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Failed President, 34 ASIAN AFF. 179, 189 (2008). 
32 The martial law rule was lifted on July 15, 1987 but the state of emergency remained in 
place until 1999 when the Temporary Articles of the Constitution were rescinded.  Wang, 
supra note 22, at 538–39. 
33 Martial law was lifted in 1987 during Chiang Ching-Kuo’s presidency.  Cheng-Yi Lin & 
Wen-Cheng Lin, Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National Security, 
TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 (2005). 
34 The total ban on travel had been modified in 1987 to allow the veteran soldiers to visit 
their families in China via third countries.  Larry Yu, Travel between Politically Divided 
China and Taiwan, 2 ASIA PAC. J. TOURISM RES. 19, 22–23 (1997). 
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small islands under Taipei’s administration.35  As a result, Taiwan ceased 
making political or legal claims on China.  Rather, Taipei currently treats 
Taiwan and Mainland China as two independent legal bodies, since a final 
political settlement has not been reached.36 
In contrast, China has not changed its stance toward Taiwan 
despite the transformation of Taiwan’s political situation, but continues to 
regard Taiwan as a renegade province.37  On the one hand, the PRC is 
committed to bring Taiwan into the fold by military means if necessary.38  
On the other hand, Beijing does not recognize the legitimacy of the 
Nationalist government’s rule, whether it is extended to China or confined 
to Taiwan.39  To avoid the impression of acquiescing to the legitimacy of 
Taiwan’s governing authorities, the PRC continues to refuse direct contact 
with Taiwan’s government, despite the fact that issues resulting from 
civilian interactions have required increased cooperation from both sides 
to reach practical resolutions.40 
Since the early 1990s, both sides have understood the practical 
need to tackle issues resulting from interactions across the Taiwan Strait.  
Even though no formal contact has been established between the 
governments of Taiwan and China, both sides have agreed on the so-
called “white gloves” strategy.41  In 1991, two proxy organizations were 
established as the only legal contact points:  the SEF in Taiwan and the 
ARATS in China.42  It is noteworthy that the SEF is a private legal body 
established under the terms of Taiwan’s Civil Code even though most of 
                                                 
35 See generally Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not Be Trampled Because the Tigers 
Need Not Fight—New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente Across the Taiwan Strait, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481 (2001) (“Desist from representing each other or exerting 
jurisdiction in the other’s territory[.]”).  Notably, among these small islands, Kinmen 
(Quemoy), Matsu, and their adjacent islets were not ceded to Japan in 1895.  These islands 
were part of the Chinese Province of Fujian but had been occupied by Generalissimo 
Chiang’s troops as a consequence of Chinese Civil War.  Chen & Reisman, supra note 18, 
at 645. 
36 Puder, supra note 35, at 510–16.  This position seems to have shifted again since the 
KMT was voted back to power in 2008.  See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
37 Id. at 507. 
38 Lin & Lin, supra note 33, at 74. 
39 Puder, supra note 35, at 507. 
40 Lin & Lin, supra note 33, at 83–84. 
41 The prototype of the white gloves strategy can be traced to the Kinmen Agreement of 
1990.  To facilitate the deportation of Chinese illegal immigrants, an agreement was signed 
in Kinmen by representatives of the Red Cross Committees from Taiwan and China.  
Pasha L. Hsieh, The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with 
Renewed Momentum, 84 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE: J. INT’L PEACE & ORG. 59, 73 & n.47 
(2009); see also Ko Shu-Ling, Ma Praises 1990 Kinmen Agreement, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 
12, 2010, at 3 (discussing the Kinmen Agreement as well as President Ma Ying-Jeou’s 
reaction to it). 
42 Yu, supra note 34, at 24. 
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its funding has come from the government budget.43  According to the 
1992 Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and 
the Mainland Area (hereinafter the 1992 Act), a special statute governing 
the cross-strait relationship, “[the] Executive Yuan may set up or designate 
an institution to handle the affairs relating to any dealings” across the 
Taiwan Strait. 44   However, the SEF has been the only institution 
designated to handle cross-strait relations, and it is subject to the 
supervision and direction of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a 
ministerial collegiate body under the Executive Yuan.45  The scope of the 
SEF’s mandate and its relations with the MAC are stipulated in 
administrative contracts.46 
However, after a bumpy start in 1993, the “white gloves” method 
ground to a halt late in Lee’s presidency.  As President Lee continued to 
advocate that Taiwan was a separate political identity from China, the 
PRC suspended all contact between the SEF and the ARATS in 1999.47  
This suspension continued after 2000, when the pro-independence 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the Taiwanese presidency.48  
Nevertheless, China could not afford to maintain a no-contact policy, 
since the political cold war did not chill interactions between Taiwanese 
and Chinese civilians.49  To address practical issues resulting from these 
interactions without abandoning the boycott of the DPP government, 
sporadic negotiations and contacts were conducted between specially 
designated private organizations in Taiwan and China, bypassing the SEF 
and the ARATS. 50   These specially designated private organizations 
handled cross-strait relations in the same manner as the SEF used to, but 
on an ad hoc basis during the DPP administration. 
China did not relent in its boycott until 2008, when the pro-
unification KMT defeated the DPP in the presidential elections and 
reverted to a platform of eventual unification from former President Lee’s 
independence-oriented policy.51  Ever since, the direct contact between the 
SEF and the ARATS has resumed and both organizations have reclaimed 
                                                 
43 Steven Goldstein, The Cross-Strait Talks of 1993—The Rest of the Story: Domestic 
Politics and Taiwan’s Mainland Policy, in ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: MAINLAND CHINA, 
TAIWAN AND THE 1995–96 CRISIS 197, 206 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 1999). 
44 Taiwan Diqu yu Dalu Diqu Renmin Guanxi Tiaoli (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條
例) [Act Governing Relations Between The People Of The Taiwan Area And The 
Mainland Area], July 31, 1992, art. IV, para. 1, China-Taiwan [hereinafter 1992 Act] (the 
1992 Act came into effect on Sept. 18, 1992). 
45 1992 Act, art. IV, para. 2. 
46 MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, WORK SYSTEM OF MAINLAND POLICY (2012). 
47 Hui-Wan Cho, China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO, 45 ASIAN SURV. 736, 742 (2005). 
48 Id. at 743. 
49 Id. at 747. 
50 This is the so-called “Macau Model.”  Jewel Huang, Now is the Time for Cross-Strait 
Cooperation, Says MAC, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at 3. 
51 Editorial: Keep the President in President Ma, TAIPEI TIMES, Jul. 7, 2008, at 8. 
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their position as the only bodies entrusted to negotiate on behalf of Taiwan 
and China.52  Moreover, Taiwan’s government officials at the level of 
deputy ministers have been seated at the negotiating table as part of the 
delegation headed by the SEF, although they take off their official hats.  
As a whole, hybridity is characteristic of the legal framework 
underpinning Taiwan’s rapprochement with China.  On the one hand, 
negotiations have been represented by the SEF as well as other private 
organizations.  On the other hand, they have been subjected to the MAC’s 
supervision, while government officials have begun to take part in the 
negotiations despite wearing different hats.  Thus, the SEF is a hybrid 
body. 
B. From Ad Hoc Management to Institutional Arrangement: the 
Road to ECFA and the Institutionalization of the Idea of 
Hybridity 
Under the “white gloves” model, Taiwan and China have signed 
over twenty single-issue agreements since 1990, most of which were 
negotiated by the SEF and the ARATS.53  The driving force for continuing 
contact between the two sides is the practical need to tackle issues arising 
from the interactions between the peoples of Taiwan and China.  For this 
reason, even during the DPP administration from 2000 to 2008, an 
agreement was signed between both sides to arrange charter flights for the 
2005 Lunar New Year holidays.54  In that case, the SEF and the ARATS 
were bypassed.  Taiwan and China were instead represented by two 
private organizations, the Taipei Airlines Association and the Civil 
Aviation Association of China.55  Although it was a one-off agreement 
that dealt with a technical, singular issue,56 it is of historical significance 
                                                 
52 Dimitri Bruyas, SEF Cleared for Resuming Talks, THE CHINA POST, May 27, 2008. 
53 These cross-agreements are signed under different names, such as “agreement,” “joint 
agreement,” and “summary record.”  According to the most recent statistics available on 
the SEF website, there are twenty-eight cross-strait agreements as of October 20, 2011, 
including those not negotiated or signed by SEF.  STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, LIANG 
AN XIEYI [NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS] (2012), available at 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=3810&CtUnit=2083&BaseDSD=7&mp=19&nowPa
ge=1&pagesize=15.  Notably, only twenty-four agreements are listed under the English 
version of the same document.  STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, NEGOTIATED 
AGREEMENTS (2012) [hereinafter SEF], available at 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4384&CtUnit=2569&BaseDSD=7&mp=300&nowP
age=1&pagesize=15. 
54 Philip P. Pan & Tim Culpan, China, Taiwan Agree to Direct Flights, WASH. POST, Jan. 
16, 2005, at A21. 
55 Id. 
56 Joy Su, MAC Chilly to Chinese Flight Offer, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 26, 2005, at 1. 
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because it paved the way for the first legal direct flight across the Strait 
since 1949.57 
As the 2005 agreement on charter flights indicates, practical needs 
have prompted the two sides to negotiate regulatory issues as a 
consequence of increasing cross-strait civilian interactions.  However, the 
parties employing this method of ad hoc management based on single-
issue agreements, whether signed between the SEF and the ARATS or not, 
have faced challenges when tackling the increasingly complicated myriad 
of cross-strait issues.  Of more than twenty agreements signed between 
Taiwan and China, more than three quarters were negotiated and 
concluded after the KMT was voted back to power in 2008.  Most of these 
agreements were negotiated individually to address specific matters, 
including the deportation of criminals,58 cross-strait cooperation on food 
safety,59 financial regulation, and a wide range of other regulatory areas.60  
Considering Taiwan’s smaller population and territory relative to China, 
the single-issue agreements in the aggregate have impacted Taiwanese 
society.61  In the meantime, as more and more single-issue oriented 
agreements are needed to respond to the new issues resulting from the 
accelerated interactions across the Taiwan Strait, the mode of ad hoc 
management has been stretched to the limit. 
This backdrop provided the impetus for the 2010 ECFA, one of 
the latest agreements signed between Taiwan and China.62  At first glance, 
ECFA is another single-issue agreement.  It is expected to lay groundwork 
for a future cross-strait common market.  However, with the prospect of 
economic integration between Taiwan and China, ECFA cannot be 
confined to the pattern of ad hoc management, and instead requires special 
note.63 
As to its substance and purpose, ECFA is an interim agreement 
under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
                                                 
57 Pan & Culpan, supra note 54. 
58  SEF, CROSS-STRAIT JOINT CRIME-FIGHTING AND JUDICIAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE 
AGREEMENT (2009). 
59 SEF, CROSS-STRAIT FOOD SAFETY AGREEMENT (2008). 
60 SEF, CROSS-STRAIT FINANCIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT (2009). 
61 Mo Yan-Chih, Cross-Strait Talks Not Transparent: Panel, TAIPEI TIMES, May 16, 2010, 
at 3. 
62 A note of caution is needed here.  As the heated debate prior to the signing of ECFA 
revealed, political calculation played a significant role in the advocacy on behalf of ECFA.  
According to this view, economic integration is expected to pave the way for an eventual 
political union.  See, e.g., Ted Yang, Economists Add Their Voices Against ECFA, TAIPEI 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at 12.  I shall limit my present analysis to the implications of ECFA 
for transboundary governance.  Together with ECFA, the Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Right Protection and Cooperation was signed on June 29, 2010.  Later, 
on December 21, 2010, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation 
was signed.  SEF, supra note 53. 
63 Cindy Sui, Trade Deal Casts Shadow on Taiwan, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LH05Ad01.html. 
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(GATT).64  Accordingly, ECFA aims to establish a cross-strait free trade 
zone, which would lead to the economic integration of Taiwan and 
China.65  Although ECFA was negotiated and signed under the terms of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), it both reflects and deviates from 
the pattern in which previous agreements between Taiwan and China were 
concluded.66  On the one hand, despite having WTO law as the underlying 
legal framework, the signatories of ECFA are not the two equal members 
of the WTO, i.e., “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen . . . Matsu” and the PRC.67  Rather, paralleling previous cross-
strait agreements, it is signed between the SEF and the ARATS with no 
reference to the principal entities they represent.  Juxtaposed with trade 
agreements signed between Taiwan and other countries that do not 
recognize its statehood, this deliberate obscuring of the principals 
represented by the SEF and the ARATS in ECFA is remarkable.68  The 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPA) 
between Taiwan and India, which was signed by the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Center in New Delhi and the India Association in Taipei, 
provides an example.  The agreement’s text suggests that the two 
contracting parties are merely the representatives of “the authorities of the 
                                                 
64 Pasha L. Hsieh, The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law, 14 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 121, 140 (2011).  GATT was the predecessor of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which was established in 1995.  See Cho, supra note 47, at 739–41 
(discussing how China has attempted to prevent Taiwan from joining the GATT). 
65 Hsieh, supra note 64, at 147. 
66 The WTO is the only international organization in which both Taiwan and China 
participate as equal members:  “Any state or separate customs territory possessing full 
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in the Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this 
Agreement.”  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XII, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (emphasis added).  Notably, Taiwan joined the WTO as 
a separate customs territory on January 1, 2002, assuming the name of the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, while China’s WTO 
membership, which came into effect on November 10, 2001, is based on its statehood.  
Hsieh, supra note 64, at 123–24.  The impact of ECFA on the overarching WTO regime in 
governing the cross-strait relationship will be addressed later. 
67 Cho, supra note 47, at 737. 
68 Notably, most of the countries in the world do not recognize the statehood of Taiwan 
and thus engage in no direct official contact with the Taiwanese government.  For example, 
since the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the U.S. has only 
maintained representation in Taipei; the representative body is called the American 
Institute in Taiwan (AIT).  Reciprocally, Taiwan’s representation in Washington, D.C. is 
called Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO).  
In terms of consular functions, both are equal to embassies.  Agreements between Taiwan 
and the U.S. also follow this path.  The U.S. is referred to as “the Territory of the 
Authorities Represented by AIT,” while Taiwan is referred to as “the Territory of the 
Authorities Represented by TECRO.”  See, e.g., Chen I-Chung, Beef Controversy a 
Political Issue, TAIPEI TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at 8. 
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respective territories” where they exercise jurisdiction.69  Thus, the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Center in New Delhi and the India Association in 
Taipei are the representatives, while Taiwan and India, the authorities of 
territories they represent respectively, are the principals. 
In contrast, reading the ECFA text in entirety does not illuminate 
whether it is an agreement signed between two principals of public 
authorities through their authorized representatives, or one between two 
private organizations, the SEF and the ARATS.  Rather, the text was 
drafted to give the impression that the ECFA would be a private contract 
between the SEF and the ARATS.  For example, Article 5, Paragraph 2 of 
the text provides for “gradually reducing restrictions on mutual 
investments between the two Parties,” rather than the territories or 
authorities represented by the SEF and the ARATS, respectively, as 
formulated in the BIPA between Taiwan and India.70  Even if the ECFA 
notification had been sent to the WTO Secretariat on May 6, 2011, 
according to Article XXIV of GATT, third parties cannot tell of the 
existence of an interim agreement between the two WTO members by 
browsing the list of regional trade agreements filed with the WTO.71 
On the other hand, deviating from the ad hoc management mode, 
ECFA has suggested a move towards formal establishment of a cross-
strait governance regime.  Article 11 provides, “[t]he two Parties [i.e., SEF 
and ARATS] shall establish a Cross-Straits [sic] Economic Cooperation 
Committee . . . which consists of representatives designated by the two 
Parties.”72  The CSECC has a potentially wide-ranging competence.  It 
will be in charge of “handling matters relating to [ECFA],” which is 
defined as “including but not limited to” the following matters: 
                                                 
69 Agreement between the India Taipei Association in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Center in New Delhi on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-
Taiwan, art. 1, para. 4, Nov. 28, 2002, available at 
http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/Taiwan.pdf. 
70 Id. at art. 5, para. 2. 
71 Staff Writer, WTO Notified of ECFA, TAIPEI TIMES, May 7, 2011, at 11.  The ECFA is 
currently listed as “The Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA)” among early announcements in relation to regional trade agreements (RTAs).  
WTO, LIST OF ALL EARLY ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE TO WTO, 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicEARTAList.aspx.  Unlike other early announcements or 
RTAs in force, this is the only agreement whose title falls short of indicating its (possible) 
signatories, as the term “Cross-Strait” does not signify the relations across the Taiwan 
Strait at all.  Rather, when visitors click the link under “The Cross-Straits Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),” further information of the signatories is 
provided.  An annotation—“The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
(China); The Straits Exchange Foundation (the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu)”—is inserted under the current and original signatories.  
WTO, THE CROSS-STRAITS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (ECFA) 
(2010). 
72 ECFA art. 11, para. 1 (1)–(5). 
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(1) concluding consultations necessary for the attainment 
of the objectives of this Agreement; (2) monitoring and 
evaluating the implementation of this Agreement; (3) 
interpreting the provisions of [ECFA]; (4) notifying 
important economic and trade information; (5) settling 
any dispute over the interpretation, implementation and 
application of [ECFA] in accordance with Article 10.73 
 
Although Article 10 stipulates that “appropriate dispute settlement 
procedures” should be established through subsequent consultations 
between the SEF and the ARATS, the CSECC will be the institution 
where disputes arising from ECFA are to be settled before the formal 
dispute settlement mechanism comes into force.  Many agreements signed 
between the SEF and the ARATS have also included the consultation 
clause.  However, without an institutional arrangement, those clauses are 
of little practical significance, and only express the good will of both sides.  
In contrast, the CSECC establishes a formal institution in which further 
consultations and future negotiations can be conducted.  Unlike other 
single-issue cross-strait agreements negotiated and concluded on an ad 
hoc basis, it is provided that the CSECC meets regularly every six months 
in addition to ad hoc meetings convened when necessary.74  Due to the 
wide range of issues covered by ECFA, the CSECC is predicted to evolve 
into an institutional platform with comprehensive competence.75 
Moreover, the CSECC will not only operate as an institutional 
forum, but will also function as a cross-strait governance body.  As the 
main implementing agency of ECFA, the CSECC is expected to grow into 
a functional equivalent of a transnational administration in charge of 
cross-strait regulatory affairs.76  In addition, it will exercise regulatory 
powers as well as authorities of (quasi-)judicial nature in interpreting 
ECFA and settling related disputes.77  Even so, the CSECC will not result 
in an established administrative or judicial body comprising permanent 
staff, but rather an institutional framework with administrative and judicial 
functions.78  As its initial formation in January 2011 suggests, the number 
of CSECC members is not fixed, while the members, all of whom are 
sitting government officials from both sides except the heads of both the 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 The convening of the CSECC ad hoc meetings requires the consent of the SEF and the 
ARATS.  ECFA art. 11, para. 3. 
75 Tsai-Lung Hung, The Political and Economic Implications of the Cross-Strait Economic 
Cooperation Committee, TAIWAN BRAIN TRUST NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2011, at 2. 
76 Id. at 2–3. 
77 Id. at 2. 
78 Honigmann Hong, CSECC Could be Recipe for Conflict, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011 at 
8. 
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SEF and the ARATS delegations, are appointed on an ad hoc basis.79  In 
addition, different ad hoc “working groups” are being set up to “handle 
matters in specific areas pertaining to [ECFA].”80  Thus, in terms of 
organization and personnel composition, the CSECC shows features of 
high flexibility and fluidity. 
Taken together, the rapprochement between Taiwan and China 
has moved from the mode of ad hoc management to some form of 
institutional arrangement, culminating in the signing of the ECFA.  Still, 
as establishment of the CSECC suggests, the institutional arrangement in 
relation to governance of cross-strait issues is incomplete.  Rather, it 
maintains characteristics of flexibility that have taken shape during the 
political thaw between Taiwan and China in the early 1990s.  Through its 
malleable organizational form and flexible personnel composition, the 
CSECC epitomizes the institutionalization of the idea of hybridity, which 
is characteristic of the legal framework underpinning Taiwan’s 
relationship with China. 
III. PUBLICNESS IN TATTERS: THE WITHERING OF DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY IN TRANSNATIONAL HYBRID ADMINISTRATION 
As epitomized in the establishment of the CSECC under the 
ECFA framework, hybridity is the underlying feature of Taiwan’s legal 
framework governing cross-strait affairs.  While the ambiguous legal 
nature of hybridity as an institutional arrangement in administrative law 
raises eyebrows, the CSECC will have little impact on regulatory 
governance if it is simply adopted to satisfy two opposing sides’ concerns 
over diplomatic protocols.81  However, as its competence covers a wide 
range of issues across the Taiwan Strait, the CSECC evokes transnational 
hybrid administration.  From this perspective, as the idea of publicness is 
obscured in hybridity, the question of lacking democratic legitimacy, of 
which transnational hybrid administration has long been accused, worsens 
with respect to the CSECC.82  To shed light on the issue of democratic 
legitimacy of the CSECC, I take up this issue in light of the idea of 
publicness, which underlies public authorities.  First, I discuss how the 
idea of publicness is institutionalized in the constitutional state and, 
alternatively, in the functioning of global administrative law beyond the 
state:  neither provides promising hope for transposing the idea of 
publicness to transnational hybrid administration.  Taking a close look at 
the CSECC, I then suggest that global administrative law, as an alternative 
                                                 
79 Ko Shu-Ling, Taipei, Beijing Set Up Trade Committee, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011 at 1. 
80 ECFA art. 11, para. 2. 
81 Barak-Erez, supra note 2, at 500–09; see also KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 1–3 (discussing 
the benefits and proliferation of hybrids). 
82 See Engel, supra note 9, at 145; Craig, supra note 9, at 113–15. 
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institutionalization of the idea of publicness, is limited in controlling 
transnational hybrid administration when non-publicness becomes an end 
in itself. 
A. Taming Transnational Hybridity: in Quest of the Idea 
of Publicness 
The rise of the state as the epitome of the modern political form 
has been ascribed to the rediscovery of the idea of publicness at the 
waning of the Middle Ages.83  The idea of publicness suggests the rise of 
political autonomy in modern politics as opposed to the blurring of public 
and private spheres in the premodern era.84  Moreover, it makes the 
concept of the constitutional state possible.  Through the idea of 
publicness, the constitutional state remains sovereign because public 
opinion is channeled through mechanisms of political representation and 
lends legitimacy to political power held by state organs.85  On the other 
hand, the political power centralized by the state is not unlimited but 
instead attached to the public through the constitutional system.  In this 
way, the constitutional system, which is mainly concerned with the control 
of political power through separation of powers and the protection of 
fundamental rights, embodies the idea of publicness.  The idea of 
publicness provides the key to understanding the challenges that 
transnational hybrid administration poses to constitutional democracy.86 
In this section, I first discuss the close relation between publicness 
and the constitutional state.  In terms of the organization of power, which 
is the underlying theme of transnational hybrid administration, the idea of 
publicness is embodied in the principles and rules regarding the control of 
political power in constitutional and administrative law.  In this way, 
constitutional and administrative law links state sovereignty to the idea of 
publicness, legitimizing the exercise of the sovereign power in the 
constitutional state.  Yet, as the new configuration of power in 
transnational hybrid administration undermines the traditional 
mechanisms in constitutional and administrative law that ensure the 
legality and legitimacy of the exercise of political power, the idea of 
publicness in the constitutional state is thus jeopardized.  The 
displacement of the idea of publicness from the constitutional state 
                                                 
83 HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 8, at 5–
26; see also MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 17–88 (2010) (discussing 
the medieval origins of Public Law and its subsequent development). 
84 LOUGHLIN, supra note 83, at 228; see also Novak, supra note 3, at 27–28 (discussing the 
roots of American public-private governance). 
85 LOUGHLIN, supra note 83, at 229–31; see also HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 
supra note 8, at 168–93. 
86 See Kingsbury, Inter-Public Law, supra note 10, at 175–88 (arguing that publicness is a 
necessary quality of international law). 
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constitutes the central concern over the rise of transnational hybrid 
administration. 
If constitutional and administrative law offer little assurance to the 
concern over transnational hybrid administration, we must adopt new 
approaches to bring back the idea of publicness.87  Global administrative 
law is argued to provide the source of legitimacy not confined to the 
sovereign state by virtue of the idea of publicness.88  Upon conducting 
close inspection, I indicate in the second part of this section that global 
administrative law’s capability of taming the beast of transnational hybrid 
administration is not unconditional. 
1.  Displacing Publicness from the Constitutional State: the 
Question of Transnational Hybrid Administration 
The idea of publicness lends legitimacy to the political power of 
the constitutional state by virtue of the constitutional separation of 
powers.89  Separation of powers is  designed to ensure that no single state 
organ holds sway in the exercise of state power.  Rather, decisions 
resulting from the complex and sometimes cumbersome political 
processes, involving distinct constitutional branches of power mediated by 
electoral processes, are regarded as willed by the public.90 
However, separation of powers is ineffective in terms of 
transnational hybrid administration.  The area of foreign affairs has 
exemplified how the constitutional separation of powers is limited.  On the 
other hand, considering the political nature of foreign affairs, the judiciary 
traditionally takes a back seat and lets the political branches, the executive 
and the legislative, take charge.91  It is true that with the traditional 
legislative oversight through legislation and appropriation as well as 
appointment, checks and balances can be maintained between the 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Christian Joerges, A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigm of the 
Postnational Constellation, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF 
LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 465 (Christian Joerges & Joseph Falke eds., 2011) 
(showing how the Bremen-centered “conflicts-law approach,” the project on public 
authority, and international organizations are representative examples in the effort to 
rebuild the legitimacy of public power in the postnational world order); see also Andreas 
Fisher-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity 
in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004) (evaluating the idea 
of rethinking conflict laws and maintaining compatibility in different legal fields); Special 
Issue, The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375 
(2008) (analyzing the rise of publicness in international law). 
88 Morison & Anthony, supra note 10, at 217. 
89 Bruce A. Ackerman, Neo-Federalism?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 153, 
166–74 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
90 Id. at 169–73; see also HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 8, at 186–
93 (discussing the constitutional state). 
91 Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 987–92 (2004). 
240 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
executive and the legislative with respect to foreign affairs. 92  
Nevertheless, developments since WWII have rendered legislative 
oversight of the executive’s power over foreign affairs ineffective. 
As more powers are delegated to international organizations, the 
legislative power enshrined in constitutions is curtailed.  For example, 
with the United Nations Security Council resolution in hand, President 
George H.W. Bush could deploy armed forces in the first Persian Gulf 
War without prior Congressional authorization.93  In addition to political 
decisions, more regulatory matters require cooperation between 
administrative agencies and their myriad international or regional 
counterparts.  Regulation and administration have become 
transnationalized.94  Take the WTO for example:  despite the so-called 
American exceptionalism in regard to international law and 
organizations,95 the U.S. was the principal advocate for the WTO as the 
institutional mechanism that would facilitate free trade.96  Yet, with the 
WTO’s enhanced role in regulating international trade independent of 
national control, concerns have been raised over the dilution of U.S. 
sovereignty.97  Moreover, as administrative agencies take on transnational 
characteristics, the state is considered “disaggregated” and regulatory 
power decentralized,98 making the legislative oversight of administration 
more difficult.99 
If the globalizing regulatory environment undermines 
constitutional design regarding the legislative oversight of 
administration,100 administrative law may be turned to in order to restore 
                                                 
92 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 63–130 (2d & 
rev. ed. 1996). 
93 Although President George H. W. Bush did obtain congressional approval for using 
armed forces to expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait, as authorized in the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution No. 660, he only turned to Congress on the eve of the 
commencement of the bombing campaign.  Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law 
from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REV. 425, 430–33 (1993) (discussing the use of 
international hybrid organizations and its relationship with sovereign states). 
94  See MARIE-LAURE DJELIC & KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON, TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 1–31 (2006) (emphasizing the 
impact of the advance of transnational governance); see also Kingsbury et al., supra note 
12, at 331. 
95  John Gerard Ruggie, American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global 
Governance, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 304, 305–06, 323–34 
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
96 Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1987–88 
(2004). 
97 Id. at 2025. 
98 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability 
of Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159, 186–89 (2004). 
99 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and 
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1055–58 (2003). 
100 ALFRED C. AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 78–130 (1992); see also 
Engel, supra note 9, at 145 (discussing how the constitutional separation of powers has 
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the idea of publicness in transnational hybrid administration.101  Yet, 
traditional administrative law has limitations in transnational hybrid 
administration. 
In the eye of traditional administrative law, hybrid/private 
administration has been regarded as the exception. 102   The classical 
approaches to alleviating the uneasiness of private/hybrid administration 
are either to trace decisions to the public agency that devolve the mandate 
of public authorities thereto, or to regard the administration as the 
extension of the devolving public agency.103  In the first approach, the 
devolving public agency, together with its staff of government officials, 
can be held accountable for the decisions made by hybrid/private 
administration.104  Under the second approach, the decisions of the agent 
private/hybrid administration can be scrutinized in light of administrative 
law.105 
To be sure, classical approaches do not succeed in bringing 
hybrid/private administration in line with administrative law.  On the one 
hand, holding the devolving public agency accountable for what 
hybrid/private administration does is ineffective at ensuring that the 
requirements of administrative law be observed.  Hybrid/private bodies 
tasked with public regulation are kept from the direct legal liability 
incurred from their decisions; rather, they are only liable to the devolving 
agencies.106  Considering the package devolution of regulatory decisions, 
devolving public agencies tend to find it difficult to react to the 
misconduct or even unlawful decisions of hybrid/private administration.107  
                                                                                                               
been weakened in regard to transnational administration, while the appearance of 
transnational hybrid administration only worsens this trend). 
101 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90, 95 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); cf. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 15–17 
(2006) (analyzing the globalization of administrative law under the eyes of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in Switzerland). 
102 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548–49, 
662–63 (2000); see also Matthias Ruffert, The Transformation of Administrative Law as a 
Transnational Methodological Project, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
IN EUROPE 3, 30–31 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2007) (addressing the development of 
privatization). 
103 Nele Parrest, Constitutional Boundaries of Transfer of Public Functions to Private 
Sector in Estonia, 16 JURIDICA INT’L 44, 53 (2009); cf. CATHERINE DONNELLY, 
DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PRIVATE PARTIES: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 102–03 (2007) (discussing legal accountability as a benefit of delegation). 
104 Richard Mulgan, Government Accountability For Outsourced Services, 65 AUSTL. J. 
PUB. ADMIN. 48, 48 (2006). 
105 Auby, supra note 2, at 518–20; see also Barak-Erez, supra note 2, at 507–08 (“When 
private actors function as de facto substitutes for the government in fulfilling important 
public functions, they should be subject to duties similar to those that would have applied 
to the government[.]”). 
106 Auby, supra note 2, at 520. 
107 KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 43–45. 
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Reacting aggressively by imposing heavy legal penalties on the entrusted 
regulatory bodies does harm to the relationship between the devolving 
public agency and the entrusted agent organizations, casting a shadow on 
the future regulatory decisions of hybrid/private administration.  In 
addition, as the relationship of devolution becomes more complicated, it is 
more difficult to identify a single devolving public agency.  Under such 
circumstances, it is hard to know which public agency should be held 
accountable.108 
On the other hand, applying administrative law directly to 
hybrid/private administration appears to be a more enticing choice but it 
turns out to be of little help.  First, private bodies tasked with public 
regulation are diverse.109   Some are established to implement public 
regulatory policies.110  The SEF in Taiwan is an example of this type of 
private body.  In contrast, other private bodies tasked with public 
regulation still conduct private business that has no bearing on public 
policy.111  In such situations, it is challenging to apply administrative law 
to private bodies in a way that aligns with their public functions.112  In 
addition, there is no agreement as to which part of administrative law 
should apply.113  Will the decision made by hybrid/private administration 
be subject to the internal review of administrative justice?  If so, will the 
hybrid/private administration establish its own internal review 
mechanism?  Will there be any qualification requirements for the internal 
reviewers?  Is the decision made by hybrid/private administration 
justiciable?  Will the notice and comment requirement in administrative 
procedures apply to hybrid/private administration?  Administrative law 
itself fails to provide clear answers to these complicated questions.114 
In sum, by combining transnational and hybrid elements, 
transnational hybrid administration defies the institutional mechanisms as 
to the control of administration provided in the constitutional structure and 
traditional administrative law.  Transnational hybrid administration calls 
the idea of publicness in the constitutional state into question. 
                                                 
108 David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 
63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 296, 306 (2003). 
109  KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 8–12; see also Jack M. Beermann, The Reach of 
Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra 
note 101, at 171–73 (discussing the border line between private and public actors). 
110 Beermann, supra note 109, at 172. 
111 Id. at 172; see Barak-Erez, supra note 2, at 495–97 (“The first signs of a privatization 
policy are usually government efforts to establish state-owned businesses—be they 
corporations owned by the central government or municipal companies under local 
government control.”). 
112 Freeman, supra note 2, at 1310–14. 
113  Paul Craig, Public Law and Control Over Private Power, in THE PROVINCE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 101, at 196–97. 
114 Id. at 211–14. 
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2.  Discovering Publicness beyond the State: is Global 
Administrative Law the Answer to Transnational Hybrid 
Administration? 
Even if there is a constellation of legal issues surrounding 
hybrid/private administration, the employment of hybrid/private 
administration in global governance seems to be inevitable,115 covering a 
wide range of issues such as banking regulation,116 governance of the 
Internet,117 the establishment of international standards,118 and so on. 
It is not hard to see why hybrid/private administration has become 
popular with global governance.  The needs for global governance result 
from the drive of globalization, going beyond the institutional framework 
designed by sovereign states.  Take the prime example of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO).  Tracing its origin far back to the 
1920s,119 the ISO has taken on the role of a global governance actor, as its 
standards have continuously exerted influence on nearly every aspect of 
daily life.  With its standards adopted by other international organizations, 
the ISO’s de facto governance role is further strengthened.120  On the other 
hand, as global governance issues have become more diverse and more 
complex, their regulation and resolution require not only innovative 
measures but also new forms of institutional arrangement. 121   Thus 
emerges hybrid/private administration, defying the traditional 
organizational forms of public administration. 
Facing the increasing importance of hybrid/private administration 
in global governance, attempts have been made to reconstruct the idea of 
publicness beyond the state.  As suggested in the preceding section, the 
idea of publicness is entwined with the state in which all political powers 
are centered.  The idea of publicness is embedded in constitutional and 
administrative law, which is traditionally state-centered, aiming at the 
                                                 
115 Kingsbury et al., supra note 12, at 20–23. 
116 Barr & Miller, supra note 101, at 16. 
117 Jochen von Bernstorff, The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as a 
Case in Point, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 257, 262–74 
(Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). 
118  CRAIG N. MURPHY & JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 49 
(2009). 
119 See id. at 5–26 (discussing the role of standard-setting, the advantages of a voluntary 
consensus standard, and the recent history of the ISO). 
120 Kingsbury et al., supra note 12, at 23; see also Oren Perez, The Many Faces of the 
Trade-Environment Conflict: Some Lessons for the Constitutionalisation Project, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 117, at 233, 239–40 
(discussing growth in the use of international standards in many fields such as economics 
and environmentalism). 
121 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability without Sovereignty, in 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 1, at 395, 407–09. 
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legitimacy of the state power.122  While this state-oriented construction of 
publicness is strained in the globalizing world, a close look at the 
formation of the idea of publicness in the constitutional state suggests an 
alternative conception of publicness. 
The emphasis on legislative oversight in the constitutional 
separation of powers and the focus on the relationship between devolving 
agencies and entrusted organizations in administrative law reveal that the 
institutional construction of the idea of publicness in the constitutional 
state is centered on the “source” of power.123  Both indicate that the 
legitimacy of the power exercised by transnational hybrid administration 
must be traced to the state through the principles and rules of 
constitutional and administrative law.  However, this only tells half the 
story of the idea of publicness.  In the constitutional state, the state power 
results from the political processes through which public opinion 
underpins decisions made by state organs.124  Elections, referendums, 
public debate over public policies, and other channels of citizen 
participation in the decision-making process are elements of the political 
process through which political power finds its legitimacy.125  Taken 
together, the idea of publicness is organized around both the source of 
state power and the political processes in relation to it.  If the state-
oriented idea of publicness falls short on the side of the source of power, 
the solution to the strained idea of publicness may be found on the side of 
political process.  Here is where global administrative law comes in. 
As widely discussed in literature, global administrative law aims 
to bring global governance into line with the ideals of rule of law by 
remodeling transnational regulatory regimes with the aid of administrative 
                                                 
122 Bernardo Sordi, Révolution, Rechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: Historical Reflections on 
the Emergence of Administrative Law in Europe, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
supra note 2, at 23, 25. 
123 Craig, supra note 113, at 198; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 121, at 409 (“This 
separation of powers has come to map onto the democratic pedigree view of law and the 
principal-agent model of accountability[.]”). 
124 Morison & Anthony, supra note 10, at 226–28. 
125 Id.  Notably, the institutional embodiment of democracy in Germany is centered around 
the parliament, while German legal scholars frown on citizen participation in 
administrative decision-making.  Cf. Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Christoph Möllers, The 
Scope and Accountability of Executive Power in Germany, in THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC 
LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 268, 281 (Paul P. Craig 
& Adam Tomkins eds., 2006) (arguing that the right to an adequate administrative 
procedure where citizens have an opportunity to be heard can complement democratic 
legitimacy but is not a substitute for it); see also Veith Mehde, Political Accountability in 
Germany, in POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN EUROPE: WHICH WAY FORWARD? 101, 104 
(Luc Verhey et al. eds., 2008) (“The personal legitimacy of the acting officials is regarded 
as deriving from the fact, that they were appointed by a minister, who . . . was chosen by 
the Chancellor, who was elected by Parliament, which was elected by the people.”). 
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law tools.126  Moreover, as global governance has grown more complex, 
the traditional conception of legitimacy of transnational regulation 
centered on the parliamentary approval of treaties is stretched to the 
limit.127  The transmission belt model of legitimacy, which focuses on the 
source of the power exercised by transnational hybrid administration, does 
not hold up.128  A new conception of legitimacy focused on political 
processes arises.  Moreover, as the story of globalization tells, this new 
conception of legitimacy looks beyond the confines of the state.  As a 
global political community is not within sight and national parliaments do 
not provide enough checks and balances,129 political processes that are 
considered essential to the legitimacy of transnational hybrid 
administration focus on non-electoral channels and extend them onto the 
globalizing regulatory environment.130  Thus, administrative law values 
such as due process, transparency, accountability, and reasonable 
decision-making are read into hybrid/private administration in global 
governance.  For this reason, global administrative law is distinct from the 
classical approaches to reining in hybrid/private administration by 
improvising the doctrinal tools of traditional administrative law.  In other 
words, drawing inspiration from the idea of publicness, global 
administrative law is not argued to break free of the will of nation-states, 
but is rather embedded in the practices of global governance.131 
                                                 
126 Kingsbury et al., supra note 12, at 37–42; see also Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law 
Without the State? The Challenge of Global Governance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 
670 (2006) (“Does [global administrative law] operate according to international law . . . or 
according to traditional administrative law[?]”); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1510 (2006) 
(“[T]he tools of administrative law, which have been used to legitimate regulatory 
decision-making in the domestic context, should be deployed more systematically . . . at 
the international level.”); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2006) (“Contestation over the right constituency of global 
governance is written into the institutional structures of global governance and global 
administrative law.”). 
127 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
128 See Nico Krisch, Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition, in THE 
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 245, 247–48 (Martin Loughlin & Petra Dobner eds., 
2010) (enumerating the limitations of a system wherein the powers of international 
institutions are derived from their delegatory relationship with member states). 
129 See Morison & Anthony, supra note 10, at 225–29 (noting the association between the 
traditional notion of democracy and the lack of a global demos); see also Esty, supra note 
126, at 1503–04 (discussing the accountability of appointed international officials). 
130 See Morison & Anthony, supra note 10, at 231–38 (“There is . . . a way in which 
internal procedures of decision-making can provide the basis for a legitimate form of 
global governance without recourse to any idea of publicness as found in the State.”). 
131 Id. at 229–31; see also Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 31–33 (“The 
idea of law being wrought by, and for, the whole society overlaps with an approach to 
administrative law[.]”); Kuo, supra note 10, at 999–1001 (“[J]urisdictions in global 
administrative law are the state and non-state entities which exercise public authorities and 
regulatory powers in global regulatory practices.”). 
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Specifically, the practices of hybrid/private administration in 
transnational regulation are reconstructed in light of the idea of publicness, 
at the core of which is “the claim made for law that it has been wrought by 
the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law 
addresses matters of concern to the society as such.”132  In this way, the 
relationship between administrative law and the practices of hybrid/private 
administration in transnational regulation is no longer centered on whether 
and how to apply the former to the latter.  Rather, “legality” is identified 
in the practice of transnational hybrid/private administration.133  For it to 
have legal character beyond a code of conduct, it must be accepted by the 
stakeholders in transnational regulation “as wrought by the whole 
society.”134 
However, such a claim pivots on whether the practices of 
transnational hybrid administration come out of the processes in which the 
public, or, rather, stakeholders can take part and influence their 
substance.135  These processes include the participation of stakeholders 
through notice and comment or hearing procedures bolstered by the 
requirements of reason-giving and transparency.  Through these 
administrative law mechanisms, the alternative routes tied to the practices 
of transnational hybrid administration redirect public opinion from the 
political processes that are aimed at preserving the state-centered source of 
political power. 136   As a result, those practices of transnational 
hybrid/private administration underpinned by these processes constitute 
part of global administrative law, functioning as the normative model for 
future transnational hybrid/private administration.  In addition, the 
exercise of regulatory power by hybrid administrations gains legitimacy.  
In this way, transnational hybrid/private administration is no longer a 
moving target of traditional administrative law, but rather an innovative 
institutional arrangement with normative values in global governance.137  
Global administrative law appears to resolve issues surrounding 
hybrid/private administration left unanswered in the state-oriented 
constitutional system and traditional administrative law. 
From this perspective, global administrative law works to rein in 
transnational hybrid/private administration, but not without limitation.  
While transnational hybrid/private administration arises to tackle the 
pragmatic needs of transboundary regulation, its hybrid or private 
                                                 
132 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 31. 
133 Id. at 29–31; Kuo, supra note 10, at 998–1001. 
134 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 31. 
135 Id. at 41–50. 
136 See Morison & Anthony, supra note 10, at 229–37 (“The process of decision-making 
may add further to the already existing standards, goals, metrics and mores of all the 
various actors who together are developing and refining new versions of global democracy 
beyond States.”). 
137 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 25. 
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character is simply functional.138  It fills in the regulatory vacuum where 
states, international organizations, or public administrative bodies have 
failed.139  It goes to great lengths to develop practices that will be accepted 
as “[having] been wrought by the whole society, by the public, and the 
connected claim that [they] address[] matters of concern to the society as 
such” just like the regulations, rules, and laws made by public 
administrative bodies.140   For this reason, transnational hybrid/private 
administration remains a functional equivalent to public administration.141  
In this regard, it echoes the classical approaches to hybrid/private 
administration in traditional administrative law:  either tracing back to the 
devolving public agency or regarding hybrid/private administration as the 
extension of public administration.  Here is where traditional 
administrative law approaches and global administrative law converge in 
regard to hybrid/private administration. 
It is the ties between hybrid/private regulation and public 
administration that have made the functioning of hybrid/private 
administration compatible with the values clustered around the idea of 
publicness.142  Only by means of these ties can the alternative political 
processes work alongside the political processes conceived in the 
constitutional system.  Taken together, the political processes in and 
beyond the state compensate for the shortcomings of constitutional and 
administrative law that focuses on the source of political power.  The idea 
of publicness is thus restored in transnational hybrid administration.  
Cutting the ties between hybrid/private regulation and public authorities 
would forestall the effort to restore the idea of publicness in transnational 
hybrid administration through global administrative law.  This is the 
condition for global administrative law to function properly with respect 
to transnational hybrid/private administration. 
B. When Non-Publicness Becomes an End in Itself: Double 
Jeopardy for Publicness in the Hybrid Cross-Strait Economic 
Regulation 
I have argued in the preceding section that the function of global 
administrative law in keeping private/hybrid administration from running 
amok at the cost of public interest is conditioned by the compatibility of 
private/hybrid administration and the values associated with the idea of 
publicness.  In other words, for global administrative law to restore the 
                                                 
138 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 6, at 505–06. 
139 Id. at 577. 
140 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 31. 
141 Abbot & Snidal, supra note 6, at 521. 
142 von Bogdandy, supra note 10, at 1914–21; von Bogdandy et al., supra note 10, at 
1378–86. 
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idea of publicness displaced from the constitution, the hybrid or private 
character of hybrid/private administration cannot be an end in itself but 
must be only a means driven by functional expediency.  If hybrid/private 
administration were deliberately designed to stand apart from the 
authorities of public administration, the invocation of the idea of 
publicness would be futile in breathing new life to the democratic 
legitimacy of transnational hybrid administration.  Under such 
circumstances, the idea of publicness is faced with the double jeopardy of 
being displaced from the constitutional state and emptied of meaning in 
the functioning of global administrative law beyond the state.  A close 
inspection of the legal framework and institutional arrangement 
concerning cross-strait governance issues in Taiwan reveals this double 
jeopardy that threatens the idea of publicness in the hybrid economic 
regulation across the Taiwan Strait.  Before going to the hybrid cross-strait 
economic regulation in Taiwan, it helps to look into why the idea of 
publicness fails to enhance the democratic legitimacy of transnational 
hybrid administration if hybrid/private administration is deliberately 
severed from the authorities of public administration. 
Suppose that the element of hybridity or privateness is added 
mainly to conceal the public character of states, international 
organizations, and other administrative bodies.  This kind of 
hybrid/private administration, which I call ultra hybrid regulation, is in 
effect designed to elude “the claim made for law that it has been wrought 
by the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law 
addresses matters of concern to the society as such.”143  If so, it would 
contradict the raison d’être of ultra hybrid regulation to reattribute the 
displaced normative values of publicness to the practices resulting from 
hybrid/private administration.  It may be argued that this case is virtually 
inconceivable given that hybrid/private administration is either created by 
public administrative bodies to extend the reach of public administration 
in a more expedient organizational form or emerges of itself to 
complement public administration in resolving regulatory issues.  Yet, a 
closer inspection of the legal framework and institutional arrangement 
concerning the cross-strait governance issues in Taiwan indicates 
otherwise. 
In terms of the cross-strait governance concerning Taiwan, there 
is not much that the constitution can do to address the issue of democratic 
legitimacy, as the SEF is not considered part of the government.  Formally 
speaking, all agreements between Taiwan and China are subject to 
parliamentary oversight, even if the signatory on Taiwan’s behalf is the 
SEF.144  However, the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight as to the 
cross-strait relations is questionable.  According to Article 5 of the 1992 
                                                 
143 Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 31. 
144 1992 Act art. 5, para. 1. 
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Act, the agreements between Taiwan and China are divided into two 
types.145  The first type refers to those agreements the implementation of 
which will require existing laws being amended or new legislation being 
made.  With respect to this type of agreement, the Legislative Yuan, 
which is Taiwan’s parliament, has to decide whether to assent to the 
signed agreement within thirty days.  Unlike the parliamentary oversight 
of other international treaties or executive agreements, however, the 
inaction of the Legislative Yuan as to the agreement under consideration 
within thirty days will be construed as parliamentary approval.146  To 
make matters worse, if the parliamentary debate on the agreement under 
consideration carries on beyond the limit of thirty days, the agreement will 
come into effect automatically.  In other words, to reject a cross-strait 
agreement, the Legislative Yuan must complete the debate and vote on it 
within thirty days.  Suppose that Legislators (members of the Legislative 
Yuan) have expressed strong opposition to the agreement under 
consideration in the parliamentary debate but failed to conclude the debate 
within thirty days.  According to the 1992 Act, the failure to vote in a 
prolonged parliamentary debate amounts to an act of tacit consent! 
The second type of agreement under Article 5 of the 1992 Act is 
of those whose implementation requires neither existing laws being 
amended nor new legislation being made.  The role of the Legislative 
Yuan in controlling this type of agreement is merely nominal in that the 
agreements are only to be filed for record with the Legislative Yuan.147  
No parliamentary vote is even needed.  Taken together, these imply that 
the Legislative Yuan is straightjacketed with respect to parliamentary 
oversight of the agreements between Taiwan and China. 
If the constitution provides no solution to the displacement of 
publicness, global administrative law may come into play in ensuring that 
the cross-strait agreements are in accordance with the rule of law and 
other constitutional principles.  In this regard, the executive oversight of 
the SEF and other entrusted organizations is important.148  However, as 
the experience with the classical approaches to hybrid/private 
administration in traditional administrative law suggests, the oversight 
from the MAC is limited too.  Either the MAC changes the SEF board of 
directors through the government share in the foundation or the MAC 
                                                 
145 1992 Act art. 5, para. 2. 
146 Xianfa Shang ‘Tiaoyue’ zhi Yihan? Hezhe Ying Song Lifayuan Shenyi? [What is the 
Meaning of “Treaty” in the Constitution? Which Kind of International Agreement Should 
Be Sent to the [Legislative] Yuan for Deliberation?], DA FAGUAN JIESHI (大法官解釋) 
[TAIWAN CONST. CT. INTERP.] no. 329 (Dec. 24, 1993), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=329; see also 1992 
Act art. V, para. 2 (providing the regulation of the Legislative Yuan’s role in these types of 
agreements). 
147 1992 Act art. V, para. 2. 
148 1992 Act art. IV, para. 2. 
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exercises its oversight in accordance with its administrative contract with 
the SEF and other entrusted organizations.149  Considering the diversity of 
cross-strait issues, however, it is unlikely that administrative contracts can 
be well drafted in advance to address all situations. 
What makes matters worse is the signing of the ECFA and the 
establishment of the CSECC.  First, as the ECFA covers a wide range of 
subject matters, the executive oversight of the SEF is stretched thin.  
Moreover, as the CSECC is gradually evolving into a transboundary 
governance body, the already limited parliamentary oversight will be 
further curtailed.  According to the 1992 Act, the SEF and other private 
organizations entrusted to negotiate with their Chinese counterparts may 
even further devolve their function to other organizations.150  However, 
the CSECC is not an incorporated organization under Taiwan’s legal 
system but instead a creation of the ECFA itself.  Thus, it is dubious 
whether the CSECC can legally act as the secondary agent organization of 
the SEF in the eye of the 1992 Act if the CSECC is to be understood in the 
framework of the 1992 Act. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the oversight of the 
CSECC should be considered under the framework of the ECFA instead 
of the 1992 Act because the CSECC is a new creation of the ECFA.  
According to this view, as the ECFA has been approved by the Legislative 
Yuan, the legal basis of the CSECC as a transnational regulatory body 
appears to be unquestionable.  Yet, considering the textual parsimony of 
the ECFA, it is inconceivable for a national parliament to devolve tasks 
and functions of such importance to the CSECC carte blanche.151  Notably, 
under the terms of the 1992 Act, parliamentary oversight of cross-strait 
affairs is limited to the approval of the first type of agreement noted above.  
Thus, as the regulatory and governance function of the CSECC is 
expected to grow without more agreements to be signed between the SEF 
and the ARATS, the Legislative Yuan will be further pushed away from 
overseeing cross-strait affairs. 
Moreover, with the CSECC staying beyond the reach of the 
Legislative Yuan, government officials may well be induced to take 
advantage of the uncontrolled cross-strait institutional arrangement as the 
main decision-making body with regard to economic affairs and thus 
                                                 
149 Should the situation revert to the political coldness during the DPP administration, more 
contacts and negotiations between Taiwan and China would bypass the SEF and be 
conducted through other agent organizations, as the 2005 agreement on charter flights 
suggested.  Vincent Y. Chao, DPP Downplays Joseph Wu Remarks, TAIPEI TIMES, May 6, 
2011, at 3.  Under such circumstances, the MAC would be left with one option:  oversight 
through the careful drafting of administrative contracts with the entrusted organizations. 
150 1992 Act art. 4, para. 4. 
151 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
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bypass regular parliamentary oversight in this regard.152  As noted above, 
government officials at the level of deputy minister have taken part in the 
CSECC.  According to Article 11 of ECFA, they are appointed by the SEF 
on the side of Taiwan.  Ironically, Taiwan’s members of the CSECC 
appointed by the SEF have included officials from the MAC, which is the 
ministerial collegiate body responsible for overseeing the SEF. 153  
Consequently, the executive oversight of the SEF by the MAC has been 
rendered toothless.  To sum up, as Taiwan’s administration of cross-strait 
relations moves toward ultra hybrid regulation, traditional oversight by 
parliament and the executive branch has been left in shambles. 
In such a situation, global administrative law may contribute to 
reining in the ultra hybrid regulation in another way.  If neither legislative 
control nor executive oversight is feasible, the CSECC may still be 
brought into compliance with rule of law values through administrative 
law tools that implement the idea of publicness.  This will place the 
CSECC among other hybrid/private administrations in global 
governance.154  Specifically, the CSECC may enact its own guidelines 
governing the procedures under which its decisions and interpretations of 
ECFA will be made. 155   Also, it may self-impose transparency 
requirements on prospective consultations pertaining to the attainment of 
the ECFA objectives.156  Moreover, the CSECC, which is entrusted with 
the settlement of disputes in relation to ECFA before the establishment of 
a formal dispute settlement mechanism, may bring in judicial or quasi-
judicial mechanisms to guarantee impartiality and fairness in dispute 
settlement. 157  In this way, global administrative law may compensate for 
the oversight deficit arising from the hybridity embedded in the 
CSECC.158 
Yet, a closer look at the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait 
affairs in general and the CSECC in particular suggests that global 
                                                 
152 If the Europe Coal and Steel Community provides a lesson, we should worry about the 
prospective role of the CSECC in surpassing the Executive Yuan as the main decision-
making body.  See PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE 
AND THE NATION-STATE 91–132, 251–82 (2010) (describing the evolution of the Europe 
Coal and Steel Community into the European Union). 
153 Ko, supra note 79, at 1. 
154 See Barr & Miller, supra note 101, at 24–28 (discussing the role of self-imposed 
administrative requirements in bolstering the accountability and legitimacy of the Basel 
Committee). 
155 Cf. ECFA art. 11, para. 1(3) (stipulating that the CSECC shall be responsible for 
“interpreting the provisions of [ECFA]”). 
156 Cf. ECFA art. 11, para. 1(1) (stipulating that the CSECC shall be responsible for 
“concluding consultations necessary for the attainment of the objectives of [ECFA]”). 
157  Cf. ECFA art. 10, para. 2 (providing the institutional and procedural measures 
governing the dispute settlement mechanism under ECFA). 
158  Cf. Barr & Miller, supra note 101, at 23 (“Whenever possible, international 
mechanisms ought to be designed to enhance, rather than supplant, the meaningfulness of 
domestic administrative law.”). 
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administrative law will not help much in this regard.  As noted above, if 
hybrid/private administration is invoked in response to the practical needs 
of transboundary regulation, administrative law tools may be instituted to 
give legitimacy and rationality to the operation of hybrid/private 
administration, making it compatible with the idea of publicness.  On the 
contrary, the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs was not created 
to fill in the regulatory vacuum where public administrative bodies failed, 
but to bypass public authorities.159   Based on its hardline stance of 
rejecting Taiwan as an equal and sovereign polity, China has refused any 
direct contact with Taiwan’s national government; moreover, any 
indication of sovereign authorities has also been rejected. 160   As a 
consequence, two proxy organizations have had to be established as 
private-law bodies; all cross-strait agreements have had to be negotiated 
and signed as private contracts between these two window organizations; 
cross-strait agreements are treated differently from international treaties 
and are only subject to limited parliamentary oversight in Taiwan; and the 
CSECC cannot be integrated as part of the government, which would 
otherwise subject it to constitutional checks and balances. 
If the hybrid institutional arrangement regarding governance 
issues across the Taiwan Strait is designed to be uncolored by public 
authorities, there is little hope that the CSECC will follow other examples 
of hybrid/private administration in global governance to introduce 
administrative law control.161  Supposing the CSECC remodeled itself on 
the idea of publicness, the CSECC’s administrative law mechanisms 
would still not automatically be regarded as sufficient.  Rather, the 
CSECC would have to open itself to scrutiny of the values emanating 
from the same idea of publicness.162  Specifically, the CSECC’s would-be 
self-imposed administrative law mechanisms would have to be assessed 
against the procedural requirements that constrain the operation of the 
sovereign state, which is considered the epitome of publicness.163  In this 
way, the CSECC would move closer to the government from which—
under the white gloves strategy—it has been designedly separated.  Also, 
further demands would be made on the CSECC to bring it under the 
control of the parliament.  Moreover, as the case of the Basel Committee 
                                                 
159 Hsieh, supra note 41, at 67. 
160 Chi Chung, International Law and the Extraordinary Interaction between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
233, 270 (2009). 
161 Cf. Barr & Miller, supra note 101, at 24–28 (describing the rule-making process 
followed by the Basel Committee, which can be viewed as an example for this purpose).  
162 Id. 
163 See Ming-Sung Kuo, (Dis)Embodiments of Constitutional Authorship: Global Tax 
Competition and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
181, 211–23 (2009) (analyzing the state government as the reference point in transnational 
administration). 
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suggests, global administrative law enhances the legitimacy and 
accountability of a hybrid body not only through its self-imposed 
administrative requirements but also through the incorporation of those 
self-imposed requirements into the domestic administrative law. 164  
However, this would result in bringing the CSECC into the government 
fold.  Taken together, these requirements would be linked to political 
processes in the constitutional system—a system laden with the character 
of the sovereign state.  Yet, this is precisely opposite to the direction of 
ultra hybrid regulation in which Taiwan’s legal framework of the cross-
strait relations has thus far moved. 
Delinking itself from any implications of sovereignty, the ultra 
hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs not only precludes the idea of 
publicness but also undermines another way of applying the WTO-related 
global administrative law rules to cross-strait relations.165  While Taiwan 
has been excluded from most international organizations because of 
China’s hardline stance of denying legitimacy to Taiwan’s sovereign 
claim as a polity, Taiwan and China have been equal members of the 
WTO from the perspective of WTO law.  It was expected that Taiwan and 
China would address their bilateral trade issues on the WTO platform.166  
In this way, direct official contact could be initiated between the two sides.  
Moreover, WTO law might compensate for the procedure and oversight 
deficit in the white gloves strategy as noted above.167  Yet, sticking to its 
hardline stance, China has averted the WTO mechanism’s enshrinement as 
the means for dealing with its trade issues with Taiwan, even if China has 
suffered economic losses due to Taiwan’s WTO-inconsistent 
discriminatory measures.168  As a result, the WTO platform does not work 
out as the overarching framework governing cross-strait economic and 
trade affairs.  Moreover, with the signing of the ECFA and the 
establishment of the CSECC, the hope for invoking WTO law to 
compensate for the existing ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs is 
further diminished.169  Regardless of the statement in its preamble that the 
ECFA is signed in accordance with the basic principles of the WTO, the 
CSECC rather than the WTO is expected to play the central role in 
                                                 
164 Barr & Miller, supra note 101, at 28–29. 
165 See generally Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade 
Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
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governing cross-strait economic and trade issues in the future.170  Again, 
this WTO-averse prospect just echoes the adoption of the ultra hybrid 
regulation of cross-strait relations. 
In sum, attempts to bring the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait 
relations in line with global administrative law fail because of the 
implications for sovereignty arising from the procedural and institutional 
requirements of the idea of publicness.  As the case of the legal framework 
governing the relations between Taiwan and China shows, when it comes 
to ultra hybrid regulation, global administrative law reaches its limit in 
reining in hybrid/private administration, in that the condition for invoking 
the idea of publicness is not satisfied.  With the functioning of global 
administrative law hampered as well as the oversight mechanisms of the 
constitutional state in shambles, the idea of publicness is faced with 
double jeopardy in the case of Taiwan’s extraconstitutional hybrid 
regulation across the Taiwan Strait. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited for functioning as an 
institutional bypass around bureaucratic procedures and providing 
expedient responses to the changing needs of administrative governance.  
As hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized in transnational regulation, 
however, concerns have arisen over the lack of transparency and the 
evasion of accountability in the face of the informality and flexibility that 
is characteristic of hybrid regulatory bodies.  The constitutional structure 
of checks and balances with respect to foreign affairs is upended with 
regulation becoming privatized and administration taking on hybridity.  
Transnational hybrid administration not only displaces the idea of 
publicness from public administration but also poses fundamental 
challenges to the core of democratic legitimacy. 
In response, interest has been reinvigorated in the idea of 
publicness.  Looking beyond the realm of constitutional law, the idea of 
publicness is seen as embedded in the underlying principles of 
administrative law.  Transposed to the transnational regulatory 
environment, the idea of publicness lends legitimacy to global 
administrative law.  Thus, global administrative law is praised as the 
antidote to secrecy and accountability-avoidance caused by the 
deployment of hybrid administration in transnational regulation.  The 
problem of democratic legitimacy concerning transnational hybrid 
administration seems to find solution in global administrative law. 
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In this article, I examined the issue of democratic legitimacy 
resulting from transnational hybrid administration and the proposed 
solution by studying the governance framework of the relationship 
between Taiwan and China in general and the newly established CSECC 
in particular.  I argued that the CSECC is deliberately designed to avoid 
the institutional features associated with the idea of publicness, exposing 
the functional limits of global administrative law.  I first analyzed the 
legal strategy underpinning the political rapprochement between Taiwan 
and China.  After revealing the move toward institutionalized hybridity, I 
discussed how democratic legitimacy is threatened as hybrid 
administration is utilized in the economic regulation across the Taiwan 
Strait.  On the one hand, transnational hybrid administration displaces the 
idea of publicness as legislative oversight over transnational 
administrative acts has been seriously weakened by globalization.  On the 
other hand, global administrative law’s function to keep private/hybrid 
administration from running amok at the cost of the public interest is not 
unconditional.  Rather, as the legal framework governing the relations 
between Taiwan and China suggests, global administrative law reaches its 
limits in reining in hybrid/private administration when non-publicness 
becomes an end in itself. 
As the hybrid regulation across the Taiwan Strait shows, both 
traditional constitutional design and global administrative law fall short of 
restoring the idea of publicness in transnational hybrid administration.  It 
is true that hybrid administration gains currency in transnational 
regulation mainly as a consequence of the changed regulatory 
environment.  It is also true that global administrative law points to the 
direction in which the legitimacy of transnational administration can be 
improved.  Nevertheless, not only the strengths but also the limits of 
global administrative law have to be carefully investigated before we 
subscribe to the displacement of the idea of publicness from the 
constitution in transnational hybrid administration to the haven of global 
administrative law.  The case of hybrid regulation across the Taiwan Strait 
illustrates the unique regulatory environment in which Taiwan is situated.  
Moreover, it alerts us to the exceptional situation in which transnational 
hybrid administration may sabotage rule of law mechanisms.  Without 
taking seriously the withering away of the idea of publicness in the 
changing, complicated regulatory environment of our globalized world, 
we may risk leaving democratic legitimacy under the siege of uncontrolled 
transnational hybrid administration. 
